Secure Identity Propagation Using WS-Trust, SAML2, and WS-Security 12 Apr 2011 IBM Impact

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Agenda

- Requirements
- Actors
- Related Security concepts
- Specifications
- Technology
 - Websphere 7.0
 - DataPower XI-50
 - TFIM 6.2 Security Token Service
- Flow of identity through the system

Disclaimers

- Here representing ourselves, not our employer.
- What we present here is one of numerous possible ways to use IBM SOA technology.
- Your situation and requirements will probably differ.
- As always, test things in a non-production environment prior to using anything in production.
- We are not responsible for spontaneous combustion of the known universe or any other undesirable outcomes associated with using what is discussed here.



Business Requirements--Hypothetical

- Maintain a high quality customer experience
- Increase business and IT agility and adaptability
- Constantly improve speed to market of new products
- Decrease the growth rate in customer servicing costs
- Provide a stable, scalable platform for payment processing
- Consistent security interface to customers

Technical Requirements--Hypothetical

- Presentation tier of a customer facing application must be able to access business logic located across different systems within the enterprise.
- Apply industry standards to solve problems whenever possible.
- Will construct wrapper services around legacy systems that are not already SOAP services.
- Standardize on SOAP over HTTP(S)
- All services must satisfy WS-I Basic Interoperability.
- All services are advertised on the ESB; Service Consumer service calls pass through the ESB.

Security Requirements--Hypothetical

- Standards-based, secure end-user identity propagation mechanism
- Mechanism should include a digital signature to ensure message integrity.
- Mutually Authenticated SSL at all hops to ensure message confidentiality (and integrity).
- Token validation and authorization decision made at ESB tier.
- Obtain identity at Service Provider tier(s) via token revalidation.



Actors

Actors

- Service Providers
- Service Consumers
- ESB
- Security Token Service

Service Providers

- Service Provider tiers host WS-I Basic Interoperability-compliant SOAP Web Services.
 - WS-I BP (Basic Profile) 1.1 (see [6])
 - SSBP (Simple SOAP Binding Profile) 1.0 (see [7])
- In our scenario, this is an application running in WebSphere Application Server 7.0.0.7 (or above).
- Application contains POJOs that implement JAX-WS Web Service(s).

See [1] for more information about JAX-WS

Service Consumers

- Service Consumer tiers host SOAP clients.
- Again, WS-I Basic Interoperabilitycompliant (see last slide for description).
- JAX-WS SOAP client.
 - Requires a client stub to be generated by RAD tooling.
- In our scenario, once again, this is a Web Application running in WebSphere Application Server 7.0.0.7(or above).

Security Token Service

- WS-Trust-compliant service(s) that supports issuing, validation, and renewal of security tokens.
- A Security Token contains identification information about a Principal(user of the system).
- We'll talk about Principals shortly.
- More information about these ideas can be found in [2], [3], and [4].

Enterprise Service Bus (ESB)

- SOA pattern
- One possible implementation of a Service Oriented Architecture(SOA).
- A middleware platform. There are many.
- A central access point for reusable, logical components (services) whose use spans multiple spheres of concern.
- For more information, see [5]

Related Security Concepts

Authentication

- Process of a remote entity (user or system) proving its identity to the system.
- Can be achieved in a variety of ways.
- In this story, we will use
 - JEE Security with Form-Based Authentication(WAS 7.0) for enduser authentication.
- Token Validation confirm a security token is valid and trusted
 - Validating digital signature
 - Checking expiration timestamp
 - Checking user exists in a User Repository
- See [9] for more information.

Principal

- An entity that can be authenticated.
- Could be a system.
 - Batch job.
 - An application.
 - A computer.
- Could be an end user.

– A Web application user in our case.

• See [8] for more information.

User Repository

- A collection of user information known to the system.
- May include: usernames, passwords, groups, group membership, and other attributes
- Examples
 - LDAP
 - Flat file
 - Database
- Master copy of all user and group information within the system.
- Trust Domain collection of systems that share a common User Repository
- In our case,
 - LDAP Repository (Tivoli Directory Server, TDS)
 - All systems are in the same Trust Domain
- See [12] for more information.

LDAP

- LDAP—Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
- A specification.
- Our user repository.
- Contains
 - Inetorgperson objects describing users.
 - Group objects describing groups
 - Users can be members of multiple groups.
- Captures group membership relationships.

Security Token

- A self-contained collection of information that systems can pass around that describes a Principal.
- May contain (we'll assume ours does):
 - User ID.
 - List of Groups.
 - Other attributes(from LDAP).
- May utilize:
 - Encryption
 - Digital signature
 - Timestamp

Authorization

- Process by which the system makes a decision of whether an authenticated principal has permission to access a resource.
- A resource could be:
 - Web Application path (Servlet, JSP, etc)
 - EJB (or EJB method)
 - Web Service
- Will often be based upon:
 - Static information e.g., LDAP Group membership or a user attribute
 - Dynamic information e.g., authentication method
- See [10] for more information.

Identity Propagation

- Process by which one system transmits identity of a requestor to another system.
- Identity Propagation usually achieved through some form of token.
 - Token contains username, group membership, other LDAP attributes.
 - Digital signature
 - Confidentiality
- We are using SAML2 tokens in this discussion.

Security Token Service(STS)

- Defined by WS-Trust spec.
- Composed of Web Service(s) that perform operations on Security Tokens.
- Client trusts STS.
 - MASSL
 - Shared key
 - WS-Security
 - Other mechanisms
- Requires a client to provide credentials to prove trust & an identity to be represented in the output token.
 - We'll call these the input credentials.
- Provides assertions about the input credentials in the form of a Security Token.
 - We'll call this the output credential.
- In our example,
 - Input credential is an LTPA2 Token
 - Output credential is a SAML2 token
- Using STS for all token transformations.
 - Central management of digital signature keys/certificates for security tokens.
 - Central management of
 - token generation.
 - token transformations.
- See [11] for more information.

Identity Propagation--Visualized



Security Within the ESB



• ESB:

- Extracts Security Token
- Validates Security Token
- Checks Authorization
- We will revisit this shortly.

Policy Driven Security

- Policy Administration Point (PAP) – component used for the creation, maintenance, change, and deletion of security policy regarding system resources
- Policy Decision Point (PDP)

 component responsible for providing a response to an authorization request to a protected resource
- Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) – component which manages access to system resources



• See [18]

Mutually Authenticated SSL

- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) provides transportlayer security between each tier of the system.
- Provides message integrity and confidentiality
- Mutually Authenticated SSL refers to the requirement of the client presenting a valid x509v3 certificate.
- In our case, all communication is over MASSL connections at each network hop.
- Could also use WS-Security Integrity & Confidentiality.
- See [13], [14], [15].

Relevant Specifications

Relevant Specifications

- WS-Security
- WS-Trust
- SAML2

WS-Security

- Provides the basic mechanisms for securing SOAP messages.
- Standard provides for the following to SOAP messages.
 - Integrity (XML Digital Signature with SOAP)
 - Confidentiality(XML Encryption with SOAP)
 - Transmitting identity tokens (SAML2, others)
- See [16].

WS-Trust

- Builds on WS-Security base.
- Provides additional mechanisms for working with security tokens.
- Defines communication with a Security Token Service.
- WS-Trust clients can make the following types of calls:
 ISSUE
 - VALIDATE
 - RENEW
 - CANCEL
- See [17].

SAML v2

- OASIS standard for exchanging authentication and authorization information.
- Information is propagated as tokens that contain "assertions" about an entity or person.
- Snippet of XML
- WS-Security provides for passing a SAML2 token in a SOAP Header.
- SAML2 spec defines use of XML Digital Signature and XML Encryption with SAML tokens.
- See [19].



Technology

- Websphere Application Server 7
- TFIM 6.2

Security Token Service

• DataPower XI50 (acting as an ESB)

Websphere Application Server(WAS) 7.0

- Description
 - JEE v1.5 compliant Application Server
 - Service Provider Platform
 - Service Consumer Platform
- Using JAX-WS SOAP Runtime.
- Out-of-box functionality (relevant to this discussion) provides
 - WS-Security Support(propagates SAML2 token in SOAP Header)
 - WS-Trust (STS client) support.
 - Local validation of SAML2 tokens(on Service Provider)
 - Dynamic Endpoints can be used to setup client x509v3 cert/key to be used with MASSL connection.
- See [22] for more information.

Tivoli Federated Identity Manager 6.2

- WS-Trust v1.3-compliant Security Token Service(STS)
- Only interested in Security Token Service, but offers solutions for a variety of Federated Single Sign On scenarios.
- Note, token validations will be done locally whenever possible.
- See [21] for more information.

DataPower XI50

- SOA Appliance
- Acting as an ESB (together with WMQ 7.0).
- Support for:
 - SOAP
 - REST
 - XML (XML Acceleration)
 - WS-* support.
 - Security(authentication, authorization, etc)
 - Many others
- Add on features support:
 - ODBC
 - TAM
 - TIBCO
 - HSM module
- See [20] for more information.



Flow of credentials Through System

End User Authenticates To System (Service Consumer)

- End user could authenticate to Service Consumer system numerous ways
 - WebSEAL scenario (identity assertion to WAS via LTPA2 token, TAI++, or other methods)
 - JEE Security(Form-Based)—our scenario does this.
 - Other
- Websphere container (Service Consumer) knows the end user by the user session's Security Context.
 - JAAS Subject describes the user's identity



Service Consumer obtains SAML2 token

- WAS7 SOAP/WS-Security runtime interacts with the TFIM STS via a WS-Trust ISSUE request.
 - Input credential: LTPA2 BST
 - Output credential: SAML2token
- SAML2 token is digitally signed by the STS (XML Digital Signature).
- Mutually authenticated SSL for WS-Trust calls.
- Custom module in TFIM STS queries LDAP for user information.
- Token cached locally in Service Consumer WAS container with patch IBM recently created.



Sover Solution Soluti

- Service Consumer uses JAX-WS SOAP Runtime and client stub to issue SOAP call.
- SAML2 token obtained from STS.
- Transport-level security (Mutually Authenticated SSL) for SOAP call.
- WS-Security Runtime injects SAML2 token into WS-Security SOAP Header.
- HTTP POST passes request SOAP message to ESB.
- Wait for response.



SOAP Request Arrives at DataPower

- HTTPS Front Side Handler advertises service.
- Request is routed to a configured WS-Proxy.



Internal ESB Security Processing

- WS-Proxy has a Request Rule defining policy.
- Service's WS-Proxy Security configuration
 - AAA Policy
 - SAML2 token validation
 - TAM Authorization
 - Exception Handler
 - Audit Logger
 - Other configuration, not relevant to security
- If Service Consumer isn't capable of passing a SAML2 token, DataPower could make a WS-Trust call to TFIM to obtain one or generate token locally.



ESB routes request to Service Provider

- WS-Proxy configuration routes SOAP request to Service Provider
 - Could be based upon
 - URL in WSDL.
 - Determined dynamically , based upon message content
- Service Provider Endpoint defined in WSDL stored in Websphere Service Registry & Repository.
- DataPower routes request to this Service Provider Endpoint.



DataPower XI50

Request arrives at Service Provider

- WAS WS-Security runtime:
 - Extracts token from request message.
 - Validates SAML2 token locally
 - XML Digital Signature validation.
 - Check timestamp.
- Security Context created
 - JAAS Subject
 - Only valid for this one service invocation.
 - Original SAML2 token stored in JAAS Subject.



Service Execution

- POJO method exposed as a JAX-WS Web Service operation intercepts SOAP call.
- Service logic is executed.

@WebService
public class Echo {
 @WebMethod
 public String echo(String
 str) { ... }

Response

- SOAP Runtime returns response to ESB.
- ESB intercepts response and passes it to Service Consumer.
- Service Consumer intercepts response.
- For synchronous, requestrespond Message Exchange Patterns, identity tokens will generally only be passed in the Consumer->Provider direction.

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Third-Party Products & Identity Propagation

- WS-Security, WS-Trust, and SAML2 can be used as the bases for secure identity propagation across compliant platforms.
- For example:
 - JBoss
 - -.NET
 - Layer 7

Thank You...

• Questions???

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